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THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF MICRO-ORGANISMS.
A REJOINDER TO MR. GEORGE JOHN ROMANES
BY ALFRED BINET.
I HAVE read with great interest the article (No. 98
of The Open Court) in which Mr. Romanes discusses
the criticisms that in my recent study of Micro-organ-
isms I addressed to him. I wish to offer a few words
in reply; endeavoring to limit within as narrow bounds
as possible the discussion that has arisen between us.
First, let us rid ourselves of a slight difference, quite
subordinate. Mr. Romanes contends, that in his va-
rious works he has assigned a much greater place to
the psychic life of micro-organisms than I have allowed.
I maintain, on the contrary, that he has almost totally
neglected that department of investigation, and that it
is an omission greatly to be regretted. In his work
" Mental Evolution in Animals," he only refers, in fol-
lowing Engelmann, to the two facts, that certain Pro-
tozoa seek the light and give chase.* This is indeed
little. But let us turn to the volume that contains the
main recorded facts of observation— I have reference
to the work bearing the title of "Animal Intelligence."
We will find there, in the first chapter, four pages de-
voted to the Protozoa. Strange to say, the first crea-
ture treated of in those pages is a Rotifer ; an animal
that belongs to a branch much higher in organization
than that of the Protozoans. The second example given
is not a whit more fortunate, for the Myxomycetae that
are there discussed are likewise not Protozoa, but veg-
etal organisms. The remainder of the section is filled
with observations by Carter upon Rhizopoda and Amoe-
bae. The latter author has made some surprising obser-
vations, which are all the more in need of confirmation
by reason of the fact that Carter does not, as Mr.
Romanes supposes, possess a competence in such mat-
ters that is incontestable ; on the contrary, his author-
ity is of a very mediocre order among men of his de-
partment, and he has committed numerous errors that
Stein has pointed out. I have not the space here to
give in full the observation of Carter, which is particu-
larly remarkable from the singular language he employs;
he speaks of the "ovarian aperture " of the Acineta,
of the "fatal lap" of the Amoeba, etc.: surely not the
language of a man of science. The following, in few
Pages 80 and 8i.
words, is the most curious of the observations he re-
ports. Carter saw an amoeba wind itself about the body
of a parent-acineta that was just ready to give birth to
a filial organism ; when the latter was brought forth
with the vibratile cilia that enable it to make a rapid
flight, immediately upon its exit from the ovary (?) the
amoeba seized and incepted it. I.find it impossible to
draw any conclusion from this fact, because I do not
know whether it is to be explained by the chance of an
encounter or by an act of prevision on the part of the
amoeba. For this reason, and many others, I am con-
strained to pass by this observation.
And that is all. Mr. Romanes speaks no further
of Microorganisms. Although, despite this dearth of
data gathered, he does not hesitate to assign them a
place in his diagram of psychical functions. Moreover,
as psychical functions, he accredits them with excita-
bility, discrimination, conductibility. Why are these
qualities thus attributed ? As the result of the obser-
vations we have cited? This, indeed, is beyond my
understanding. It appears to me, that there is no re-
lation whatever between the chart and the observa-
tions contained in the text.
I shall no longer tarry by like minor points of de-
tail, and now immediately come to a question of much
greater importance, upon which Mr. Romanes and I
are divided.
I refer to the matter of consciousness. When we
come to deal with comparative psychology, and study
an animal organism from the point of view of its mo-
tory activity, we are naturally led to ask whether the
animal in question is conscious of the stimulations
received from the outer world and of the movements
it performs as the consequence of those stimula-
tions. This is a question of such high importance
that Mr. Romanes begins with it his study of Mental
Evolution in Animals. The first chapter of that work
bears the title "The Criterion of Mind " and it is occu-
pied with the investigation of the physical indices that
best enable us to determine whether a living creature is
endowed with conscious activity. The author has not
concealed the difficulties of his undertaking, and he
has explicitly recognized that the question propounded
is incapable of receiving a direct experimental solution.
In the matter of consciousness, the individual is im-
mediately cognizant of only his own consciousness ; he
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knows that he has certain thoughts, that he expe-
riences certain pleasures, pains, feehngs, etc. To es-
tablish the existence of consciousness in other organ-
isms than ourselves, we are obliged to resort to in-
ferential reason, to inductions more or less perfectly
founded, and our inductions, moreover, can never be
directly confirmed by experience.
These peculiar conditions plainly render the study
of consciousness very difficult, and the question arises,
whether, indeed, it be prudent to take this problem as
the basis of comparative psychology, and to subordi-
nate, in a way, all others to it. But Mr. Romanes has
not hesitated. He has produced a criterion of mind
that answered his purpose of classifying the different
animals from the point of view of their psychical facul-
ties. The fact taken as criterion, is the ability to learn
by individual experience. "The criterion of mind,
ejectively considered, consists in the exhibition of
Choice, and the evidence of Choice we found to con-
sist in the performance of adaptive action suited to
meet circumstances which have not been of such fre-
quent or invariable occurrence in the life-history of the
race, as to have been specially and antecedently pro-
vided for in the individual by the inherited structure
of its nervous system. " *
Accordingly, then, all motory activity apparently
fixed in the individual and in the species by heredity,
can furnish no competent evidence of its being a con-
scious activity.
We shall return, in due time, to this criterion, of
which this commendation at least may be made, that
it is the most carefully elaborated of all hitherto pro-
posed. Mr. Romanes has taken much pains to in-
stitute exhaustive researches in relation to the psycho-
logical problems that he regards the indispensable pre-
liminaries to a study of the mental evolution of an-
imals. It remains, however, to be seen, whether the
results he has obtained can be accepted.
I shall now explain the point of view from which
I have proceeded, in writing my treatise upon the psy-
chic life of micro-organisms. This point of view has
nothing in common with that of Mr. Romanes. I did
not set out, as he has, with laying down a criterion of
mind or of consciousness; and if I did not do so, it
was not because I forgot it, but because I deemed it
imprudent. The problem of consciousness, so soon
as I had closely examined it, seemed to me absolutely
insolvable ; and now again, in spite of all the pains I
have taken to re- read the work of my adversary, I
still consider that investigation fruitless—at least for
me. I accordingly put it out of my way : I do not
entirely reject it as the positivists do, for questions of
origin and purpose,— I reserve it. I, in this way
undertook to write a psychology of micro-organisms
*Page 59.
without concerning myself to ascertain whether these
low-class creatures were or were not conscious of the
stimulations they receive from their environment, and
of the movements of adaptation they perform in con-
sequence of these stimulations. I, moreover, expressly
emphasized this reservation on page 6i of the American
edition of my work.
I ought, perhaps, to have insisted more strongly
upon that reservation, which Mr. Romanes does not
seem have noticed ; I should have pointed out what the
inherent difficulties were, in a discussion of any criter-
ion whatsoever of mind. My excuse for not having
done so, is, that I modestly proposed, in that work, to
present new observations, little known to psycho-
logists ; and if I added to those facts a few lines of
comment, it was done simply to emphasize their im-
portance.
Possibly, the reader will ask. What can a compara-
tive psychology lead to, the chief problem of which is
summarily suppressed ? What interest, it will be said,
does the psychological study of micro organisms pos-
sess, if we resolve not to investigate the degree of con-
sciousness enjoyed? Suppressing that question, what
remains ?
In answer to the objection, I will reply with Mr.
Romanes, who in this regard must wholly share my
opinion, that what we call a conscious phenomenon,
such as a perception for example, a ratiocination, an
act of memory, is in reality a complex and deceptive
operation ; simultaneously with the state of con-
sciousness revealed to each one of us, an especial work
is performed in the ganglionary cells connected with
the function set in activity, and although very little is
known of the inner nature of this work, its existence
at least may be definitely known by the various mus-
cular, thermal, and secretory effects that it induces in
the organism. The acts of life of relation, therefore,
may be studied from two points of view : from the
subjective, mental point of view, and from the ob-
jective, material point of view.
Now this is precisely what I have done. In my
work on Micro- Organisms, I particulary endeavored to
bring this side of the question to the light. In exam-
ining, for instance, tlje observation of Verworn upon
Difflugia urceolata, I sought to analyze the complicated
acts of preadaptation which that animal executes, with-
out putting to myself the question whether Difflugia
was conscious of the end sought after. The objective,
the palpable fact was, that the animal performed an
act of preadaptation.
It will suffice, in fine, to say, that, having come
to the conviction that the question of consciousness is
one of the most difficult and complex that can be pro-
pounded, I had systematically excluded that question
from my study of Micro-organisms; I treated it in no
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aspect, I even deemed it necessary, the only time I al-
luded to it, to state that it appeared to me almost in-
solvable.
No one, in my opinion, has a right to reproach an
author for proceeding with too great prudence ; and
the position I have taken, moreover, it is my inten-
tion absolutely to maintain. I shall maintain it, until
new facts been brought to my knowledge competent
to clear up the psj'chology of consciousness and un-
consciousness.
However, I must now occupy myself more espe-
cially with Mr. Romanes's opinions on comparative
ps)xhology ; I criticized his opinions in the preface to
my treatise and to those criticisms he has replied.
Mr. Romanes reproaches me with having contested
various interpretations of his, that were the regular
application of his criterion of mind, and with not hav-
ing spoken of that criterion, which I appear to be
ignorant of. I am pleased to own, upon that point,
that my honored adversary is right. It was posi-
tively wrong of me, not to have entered upon the
question as a whole, and it would have been better
not to have summarily treated the matter in a few
lines. I propose, then, to correct, to the best of my
ability, the omission I have made, and carefully to ex-
amine the criterion of mind that Mr. Romanes has
propounded, and to which I have referred in the first
part of this article.
To escape the possibility of future errors, I shall
examine Mr. Romanes's theory by reference to the
data contained in the first six chapters of "Mental
Evolution in Animals." We will return once more to
the "criterion"; pointing out the method the author
pursues to present it and at the same time to prove it.
"The distinctive element of mind," says he, "is con-
sciousness ; the test of consciousness is the presence
of choice ; the evidence of choice is the antecedent
uncertainty of adjustive action between two or more
alternatives .... if there be no alternative of adjust-
ment, it is impossible, in an animal at least, to distin-
guish reflex action from mental adaptation. Accord-
ingly, adjustive actions that are always the same in
the same circumstances of adjustment, in short such
as depend upon inherited structures in the nervous
system may be regarded as devoid of consciousness.
In a word the power of learning by individual expe-
rience is the criterion of mind."
It is to be observed, that the employment of this
criterion has availed Mr. Romanes to distribute the
different animal species in a psychological classifica-
tion summarized in the form of a diagrammatic chart,
to which we have already alluded.
Before proceeding further, we are to note, that the
criterion proposed by Mr. Romanes must necessarily
rest upon the stud}' of his own consciousness, that is
to say, of his own subjective impressions. From ob-
serving himself live and feel, he has been able to say
that such an act is conscious and such an act not con-
scious. He cites, as illustrative, the reflex actions,
which have, he says, a quasi-intellectual activity and
which, nevertheless, are devoid of consciousness. We
might add thereto that complete class of automatic
movements, so many in number, that we perform sev-
eral hundred times in the course of a day, not only
without volition on our part, but without any appre-
ciable element of consciousness whatever involved.
If it were required, accordingly, to rel)' exclusively
upon introspection, it would be comparatively easy to
mark in every circumstance the limit of consciousness
;
and the limit once marked, we might say : on this side,
there is consciousness, on that unconsciousness. But
recent facts, a multitude in number, and observed by
so many different investigators that they cannot be
questioned, show that the introspective method cannot
elucidate the question we have just presented. I am
obliged, at this point, to take Mr. Romanes into a
province that is not his own, and to speak with him of
researches that have been made of late years in France
upon the various disorders, of consciousness in hys-
terical individuals. These researches, which are well-
known to the readers of The Open Court, have shown
that there exists in individuals affected with hysteria a
plurality of consciousnesses ; when, for example, we
provoke a movement in a member that apparently is to-
tally insensible, that movement is not perceived by
what we call the principal consciousness of the sub-
ject ; but it is taken up by a secondary consciousness
which is able to retain the recollection of that percep-
tion. There are, accordingly, in such subjects, phenom-
ena that seem to fall without consciousness and which
yet are not unconscious ; they are, if the expression be
allowed, sub-conscious. The presence of a plurality of
consciousnesses is not, moreover, peculiar to the men-
tal organism of hysterical patients. Analogous dis-
turbances are found in all individuals who present what
is called "automatic writing, "and we know, at this
day, that such subjects are extremely plentiful. These
experiments contain a teaching that it is proper to
emphasize : namely, that introspection has limits which
are not those of consciousness but those of one con-
sciousness. There is nothing to prove that in the nor-
mal individual many a perception, many a ratiocina-
tion are not produced, which never get to the princi-
pal consciousness, but which go to form a minor rudi-
mentary consciousness beneath the former. This opin-
ion has been upheld, and not refuted.
Following out these ideas, we are come so far, as
to give the word unconsciousness an entirely new
meaning ; having brought forth that character of sys-
tem atization found at the basis of every well-organized
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consciousness. Our assumed unconsciousness would
be nothing more than elements of consciousness that
are not coordinated among each other and that do not
form a compact synthesis. Thus, to take a typical
instance borrowed from my own personal experience,
I present a highly complicated automatic movement,
consisting of taking a key from my pocket and insert-
ing it in the lock of the door, every time I return to my
home. Now, it very frequently happens that when I
am about to pay a visit to some friend, I pull the key
from my pocket the moment I approach his door.
That movement, it is plain, is not voluntary ; and it
does not become a conscious movement until the key
is half inserted in the lock ; at this moment, my will
intervenes to suppress the act. If we were to trust
solely to the evidence of consciousness, we could
plainly maintain that this act is unconscious ; but the
observations I have just advanced forbid asserting
anything certain in that regard ; it is possible that a
phenomenon of consciousness is produced which re-
mains isolated, which does not connect itself with my
principal consciousness, and which, consequently, for
me is as if it did not exist at all. I do not insist upon
this hypothesis, but unquestionably it must be taken
into account.
We cannot take Mr. Romanes to task for not hav-
ing regarded these recent facts, which are of later
date than his works. Nevertheless, we must observe
that the hypnotic experiments to which I have just al-
luded, tend considerably to widen the domain of phe-
nomena of consciousness, and materially to weaken
the criterion of mind that Mr. Romanes has invented.
I had, accordingly, just reason for saying, at the be-
ginning of this article, that when we deal with a ques-
tion so delicate as that of consciousness, it is neces-
sary to be very cautious.
Mr. Romanes will not reproach me, I hope, with
having far-fetched my arguments ; for he has himself
expounded, in excellent terms, the nature of the oper-
ation termed "ejection" which avails us to come at
knowledge of other consciousnesses than our own.
Mr. Romanes has shown that this operation is ac-
complished by projecting into the minds of others
what has transpired in our own ; and every investiga-
tion, accordingly, that we make concerning the nature
and extent of consciousness in man is of immediate
consequence to the so-called ejective method.
But let us leave general considerations aside and
examine the thesis of Mr. Romanes more closely. Sup-
pose it were absolutely proven, that to the functional
activity of the nervous system there are two parts : a
conscious part and an unconscious part ; what will fol-
low therefrom ? and what is the conclusion that in-
duction will draw from that fact when we come to in-
terpret the psychic life of any animal whatsoever ?
The conclusion that to me appears the only just
one, is, to translate the inference thus arrived at, into
the life of relation of every living organism, and to say
that every animal is endowed with a conscious activity
and an unconscious activity. We shall thus assign to
every animal, by an effort of induction, the complete
result of the introspection that each individual can
bring to bear upon himself ; and in order to distinguish
in every animal the part of consciousness, we will
make use of the distinction established with reference
to ourselves,—namely, that conscious acts are those
which are adapted to new circumstances.
But the supposition cannot be entertained, that a liv-
ing organism may only present acts of adaptation trans-
mitted by heredity. An author who recognizes, and up-
holds with the ability of Mr. Romanes, that animal in-
telligence passes through an evolution comparable to
organic evolution,* would contradict himself if he were
to allow that certain animal species, not confined to
unusual conditions, (as those of parasitism, for in-
stance,) could not possess the power of learning by in-
dividual experience. But, as that power is regarded
by Mr. Romanes himself as the criterion of mind, it
follows, it seems to me, that he was wrong, in making
out his diagram, to fix the lower limit of consciousness
at the level of the Coelenterata.
Furthermore, it may be said, that, in treating of
theoretical questions of this class, Mr. Romanes is not
sufficiently concerned about the origin of those " inher-
ited mechanisms of the nervous system which are so
constructed as always to produce the same acts in the
same circumstances of stimulation." These mechan-
isms were not always hereditary ; heredity which is
nothing but a preservative force, a memory of the
species, supposes an anterior power of acquisition.
The sucking of the teat, which is.one of the earliest
hereditary acts of the human race, may be explained
by heredity among the mammifers ; but in order that
that power may have been transmitted, it must have
been acquired ; and the acquisition must have taken
place at the time of the formation of the mammiferous
type.f If we apply the criterion of Mr. Romanes to
cases of this class, we are forced to the conclusion,
that consciousness is present at the beginning of all
acts and movements of adaptation.
I embrace neither side, upon this question, which,
it seems to me, at the present time is not ripe for so-
lution. I confine myself to pointing out my reasons
for not having accepted the criterion proposed by Mr.
Romanes.
Will he himself always remain true to it ? I
doubt it.
* Read, for example, his chapter on the Plasticity of Instinct, p. 200, Mental
Evolution in Animals.
t On this point, read Mr. Romanes's passage upon the Secondary Instincts,
page i8g.
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Upon again carefully reading his work on "Mental
Evolution in Animals," I believe I have come upon a
point, in his definition of instinct, very difficult of
comprehension. On the one hand, Mr. Romanes
says, that "the only distinction between adjustive
movements due to reflex action and adjustive move-
ments accompanied by mental perception consists in
the former depending on inherited mechanisms within
the nervous system being so constructed as to effect
particular adjustive movements in response to partic-
ular stimulations, while the latter are independent of
any such inherited adjustment of special mechan-
isms to the exigencies of special circumstances." Fur-
ther on, he insists on "the variable- and incalculable
character of conscious adjustments as distinguished
from the constant and foreseeable character of reflex
adjustments." After carefully reading the passage
quoted, one is astounded to find instinct defined as
"reflex action in which there is an element of con-
sciousness" .... notwithstanding "the instinctive ac-
tion be similarly performed under similar circumstances
by all the individuals of the same species."* The
contradiction is very apparent.
But I must stop. I believe I have said sufficient
to convince my readers that the question of conscious-
ness is extremely difficult, both to put and to solve;
and that rather than to lose one's time in examining
that problem, it is much better to make observations
and to institute experiments.
The merit of the scientific labors of Mr. Romanes lies
quite in another direction : it consists in the consider-
able number of observations he has made and the ex-
periments he has instituted in relation to the psy-
chic life of animals ; and no one can admire more than
I the intelligence and sagacitj' of which he has given
such ample evidence in that domain. I trust, that the
criticisms I have herein advanced in defense of my
opinions, opposed to his upon a particular point of
scientific research—that is, as to whether the study of
consciousness in lower animals ought at present to be
entered upon—will not prevent the recognition of sym-
pathy I feel with an investigator who upon so many
other points defends the ideas that are mine.
Paris, September, 1S89.
ASPECTS OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY.
PSYCHOLOGY IN GERMANY.
BY JOSEPH JASTROW, PH D.
Having reviewed the general departments of mod-
ern psychological research, I shall attempt to portray
in the light of a recent European tour, the actual con-
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dition of the study in the chief educational countries
of Europe, and will append to this some notes upon
psychological progress at home. The present contri-
bution will deal with Germany and indirectly with the
educationally allied countries of Austria and Northern
Europe.
The two most prominent German contributions to
psychology are in completing our knowledge of the
physiological bases of mental action and in posing and
partially solving the specifically psycho-physical prob-
lems of Experimental Psychology. The former devel-
oped naturally from the restoration to recognized kin-
ship of two sciences that had become separated by
mutual misunderstandings, and had been led to follow
divergent paths with only occasional and half-con-
cealed communications between them. While at first
this new relation seemed to take the psychologist into
fields far removed from his specialty, the frequent
discoveries of psychologically important facts in unex-
pected quarters of this domain have deepened his in-
terest in the labors of his brother scientists. The
modern problem, to the elaboration of which Germany
has so largely contributed, is the detailed investigation
of the functional nexus between portions of the nervous
system and the complex of activities that constitute
life. This problem becomes most interesting as well
as most difficult in relation to the nervous system of
man. At first the methods of gross anatomy and finer
dissection revealed all that was known of the nervous
system, but with the marvellously increased powers
furnished by the microscope and the accompanying
technique of section-cutting, hardening, and staining,
with, too, the utilization of pathological conditions and
of embryological formations, for studying normal rela-
tions, our notions of the wonderful complexity of the
nervous system has been enlarged beyond all expecta-
tion and the range of physiological problems propor-
tionately extended.*
It would carry us too far into details were we to
attempt a resumd of the current facts and conceptions
* The chief anatomical methods of to-day are : (i) The methods of coarse
dissection and fibering ; (2) Section cutting and a variety of stainings to bring
out and differentiate the different elements of nervous tissue (the first section
was cut by Stilling, in 1S42) ; (3) The method of studying the progress of de-
generation in nerves when cut at various points, introduced about 1850, and
soon followed by (4) The application of the same principle to the effect of
disease in man
; (5) Gudden's method of extirpating a peripheral or central
portion of the nervous system in a young animal and observing what parts fail
to develop, with (6) The application of this to abnormal conditions in man,
e. g., when a man is born without arms and the ganglion cells of the cervical
enlargement are found shrunken or absent; (7) The study of the embryolog-
ical appearances, it being found that the several fibre-systems appear and are
enclosed in their medullary sheaths (rendering them capable of functioning)
at different periods, and thus making possible an analysis extremely difficult
in the adult (Flechsig, 1872, on) ; and (g) The method of comparative anatomy,
/.
€., noting the relative development of parts in differently endowed types of
animals. For a concise statement of results in this field see Edinger, " Zehn
Vorl€sungi-n iibcr den Ban der No-fosen Central- Organe,'' 1885. Or more fully
and recently Obersteiner. Anteititng bei Studittm des Battes der Nervdsen Ccn-
tral-Organc, 1S88. Special works are by Flechsig, Meynert (Translated),
Von Gudden. Diagrammatic schemes are given by Flechsig, Aeby, and
Rohon
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respecting the structure and function of the nerve-
cell (the nucleus of which is now believed to be the
origin of its growth, shrinking when the cell is over-
stimulated, paling away when the function is lost and
containing within itself the ultimate elements of the
forces of heredity') ; the growth, functioning, and decay
of nerve fibres ; the demonstration by a variety of
mutually corroborative methods of the columns of
fibres in the spinal cord, to which, generally speaking,
the various sensory nerves contribute as they ascend
posteriorly, and from which the motor nerves emerge
anteriorly ; the reflex-centres of the gray matter of the
cord, the properties of which, though mechanical, are
so purposive in their nature as to lead some physiolo-
gists to speak of a "spinal-cord soul" and which
though in a measure independent of the higher cen-
tres serve a most delicate and valued index of the ef-
ficiency of the whole organism ; the centres of the
7nedulla oblongata that regulate for us the functions of
mere living and so leave our brains free to make life
worth living ; the complex system of centres lying near
the base of the brain and collectively known as the
basal ganglia, that may be regarded as an efficient
force of clerks registering and controlling that large
class of more or less habitual actions, that no longer
need our voluntary and conscious attention and so
have been handed over to our automata ; the centres
of the cerebellum specially related to the process of
locomotion ; and supreme in the hierarchy of nervous
centres, the crowning centralizing power, the cortex
of the cerebrum where lie, "half-concealed and half-
revealed," the mysterious properties by virtue of which
an impression is followed by an expression, the subject
comes into relation with the object, and knowledge
and development become possible.* It would carry
us still further into details to trace the connections be-
tween these various centres : the fibres of the corpus
callosum that bind the two hemispheres of the brain
together and perhaps prevent the dissolution of per-
sonality that seems to be a favorite fancy of imagina-
tive writers ; the complication of relations introduced
by the duplication of parts in the two halves of the
body, and furthermore by the decussation of the fibres
in their course from end-organ to brain, so that the
* These researches lead up to, and centre iu, the localization of function
in the cortex of the brain upon which so many scholars have concentrated
their efforts, and which promises to form a permanent landmarl< in the history
of physiology. The researches take their origin in the discovery of the elec-
trical excitability of the cortex in 1870 by Fritsch and Hitzig, though in part
connected with the earlier localization of the motor speech-centre (Broca's
convolution) by the French physiologists. The chief methods pre the method
of irritation, observing the movements, etc., following the stimulation of de-
finite areas of the cortex ; the extirpation method, removing such areas and
noting the impairment of function that follows ; the method of pathology that
correlates abnormal symptoms with postmortem appearances besides the
physiological applications of the anatomical methods above indicated. Very
much of this work has been done and is going on in Germany, and the princi-
pal workers who have all published extensively on the question are, Exner
(Vienna), Mnnk (Berlin), Goltz (Strassburg), and others.
right brain feels the pinch in the left hand, and the
race is largely right-handed because it is left-brained ;
the fibres of the corona radiata spreading in all direc-
tions from the basal ganglia and lower centres to the
cortex of the brain ; the associative fibres uniting dif-
ferent centres of the same hemisphere as well as neigh-
boring convolutions with one another. All these have
passed from the stage in which they were personal or
national contributions and have become part of the
common knowledge of mankind.
The results just enumerated were elaborated by
physiologists and as furthering the progress of their
own science ; their psychological importance being
recognized by the modern school of psychologists.
We turn now to the 'contributions of the latter to the
foundation of their own speciality. The leader in this
movement is Prof. Wilhelm Wundt, of Leipzig, who
in 1879 established there the first exclusively psycho-
logical laboratory. He, too, first brought together
the scattered results in this domain (^Physiologische
Psychologic, first edition 1874, 2d 1880, 3d 1887)
and effected the recognition of the new science by the
scientific world at large. For anything like an ade-
quate account of the problems and results of German
psychological activity, one must refer to Wundt's
treatise (closely followed by Ladd in his "Elements
of Physiological Psychology") and for special studies
to the numbers of the Philosophische 6'/«^/V« published
by Wundt since 1882. It must suffice here to indicate
the several lines of study and the general direction of
advance.
What has been said in general under the head of
experimental psychology applies with equal truth to
German psychology in particular. The study of the psy-
cho-physic law both theoretically and experimentally,
is essentially a German study. Besides the work of
Fechner himself and the important contributions of
Prof. Miiller, of Gottingen, Wundt and his pupils
have done much towards establishing to what senses
the law applies, within what limits its validity is con-
fined, what factors contribute to, or interfere with, its
applicability, what methods and precautions must be
used in testing it. It is impossible to express in a few
words the present condition of the study, though I
may venture the statement that the law seems to hold
approximately for sensations within the ordinary range
of intensity—and for sensations yielding information
sufficiently definite and yet not definite enough to be
apperceived as quantitativelj' composed.
The measurement of the time taken up by mental
processes has been the favorite study in Wundt's labo-
ratory for several years. The results have taught us
how long it takes to signal that we have perceived a
sight, a sound, or a touch ; how long to recognize the
character of a sensation, say, that a color is blue or a
THE OPEN COURT. 1937
I
tone high ; how long' to make similar distinctions with
letters, with sounds, and how this time increases as
there are more and more impressions amongst which
a distinction is to be made ; how long it takes to will
to move our right hand or our left, and how much
longer to move a given one of the ten fingers ; how
long for one idea to call up another and how much
longer when the nature of the association is limited,
e. g., when the relation between the words must be
that of whole to part ; how long to name a letter, or a
picture; how long to translate a word or name an ob-
ject in a foreign language ; how long to form a simple
judgment ; to perform an easy numerical calculation
or recall an item of information. Not the time-measure-
ments merely, but the theories of mental acquisition
that the results favor and the influences that vary the
results have been carefully studied. The nature and
intensitj' of the impression, the preparedness of the
subject, the fore knowledge of the nature of the stim-
ulus, and the direction of the attention, whether upon
the sensation or upon the movement,—are all import-
ant factors. Mental weariness, sensory fatigue, ir-
regular and unexpected impressions usuall)' lengthen
the process, while the action of drugs and semi-morbid
conditions show another class of influences. The in-
dividual variations or 'personal equation ' of the as-
tronomers, with whom indeed this study originated, also
affects the result ; the general law being that the more
complex the operation the greater are the differences
in the times that it takes different persons to perform
it. Again, the curve of practice has been experimen-
tally derived, and the gradual shortening of the time in
school-children, as they advance from class to class,
and conversely the extreme lengths of these times in
the dull and weak-minded suggest the practical im-
portance of such studies. Nor is the field limited to
these more elementary processes ; as the results them-
selves indicate a valid analysis of the processes of cog-
nition, the researches are being pushed further on into
the study of the higher faculties. We already have
a valuable experimental study of memory by Dr. Kb-
binghaus, and an ingenious investigation of complex
associations and judgments by Dr. Munsterberg.
Here too the study of the time is necessarily com-
bined with a study of the nature of the mental opera-
tion in question. It may not be too venturesome to
predict that the laws of association for which so many
philosophers have earnestly striven, can only be ad-
equately established on the basis of such experimental
methods, and that these alone can bring about a cor-
rect appreciation of the laws of memory, that will make
impossible the recent phenomenal success of a pseudo-
psychological adventurer.
There remains the consideration of the study of
the senses in other aspects than those treated, not to
speak of the variety of miscellaneous problems grad-
uall}' entering the domain of experimental psychology.
The problems are here so many and so various as to
make even a bare mention of them exceed the space
at my disposal. As problems central in the interests
of German psychologists may be mentioned the re-
searches growing out of the discovery of Weber, that
there is for each part of the skin a limit at which the
points of a pair of compasses will be perceived as two.
On the forefinger two points separated by one-twentieth
of an inch seem as one point, on the back of the neck
they may be separated by over an inch and still seem
as one. The theory of "sensory circles" has been
devised to explain these facts. But the survey of the
field is too incomplete to warrant the acceptance of
any theory as final. The study of dermal sensibility
has been enriched by the discovery of the 'hot' and
'cold points,' or areas in which a body of neutral tem-
perature gives rise to distinct sensations of heat and
cold; the possibility of pressure-points has also been
indicated. The nature of the muscular-sense with the
discussion of the 'innervation theory' is another
closely allied department of research. A second im-
portant group of problems deals with the analysis of
musical sensations to which Helmholz has contributed
so largely ; it may be sufficient to mention the work of
Prof. Stumpf, the Halle psychologist, (now appearing
in several volumes,) as an evidence of the continued
interest in this field. As a third central point may be
mentioned the psychology of vision. Although much
attention has been given to other problems, the main
interest has been in those that contribute evidence
bearing upon the theory of color vision, Helmholz and
Hering being the recognized leaders of the two views,
and upon the great controversy between nativists and
empiricists upon the perception of space. In connec-
tion with these, however, a large number of subsidiary
points have been investigated. The sensitiveness of
the retina in its different portions to form, color, and
motion ; the estimation of size and distance ; the per-
ception of solidity as illustrated by that truly psycho-
logical instrument, the stereoscope ; the relations of
sight and touch and the coordination of sensory with
motor visual factors, are some of the dominant lines of
interest in psycho-physiological optics.
While these are the departments of psychology
specially cultivated in Germany, it can be fairly said
that there is no promising line of investigation to which
the Germans have not contributed. Prof. Preyer has
written the most comprehensive treatise on child- de-
velopment ; we have many valuable German studies
of animal psychology both experimental and theoret-
ical ; Prof. Bastian, of Berlin, is an acknowledged
leader of the psychological anthropologists; while in
morbid psychology we have the most excellent con-
1938 THE OPEN COURT.
tributions of Krafft- Ebbing, (Vienna,) and Emming-
haus, (Freiburg,) of Kussmaul, (Strassburg,) and
Wildbrand, (Hamburg). The phenomena of hypno-
tism are attracting the attention of German psychol-
ogists with renewed interest, and they have intro-
duced into this study a valuable critical element. And
finally the application of psychology to the Qerman
specialty, education, has resulted in the science of
pedagogical psychology.
Before leaving the topic of German psychology, it
may be worth while to survey the local centres of in-
terest to obtain the basis for an outlook upon the future.
The physiological, the anthropological, the compara-
tive and morbid aspects of psychology have a sufficient
guarantee of vitality in their growing practical im-
portance, and in the various classes of specialists
whose interests they command. It is rather for ex-
perimental psychology, as creating new realms and
methods of investigation and in part running counter
to the traditional psychology, that special provision
must be made. The influence of the psychological
laboratory at Leipzic is spreading, and the foreign
students studying there have, in several cases, suc-
ceeded in introducing similar innovations in their own
countries. Prof. G. E. Miiller, of Gottingen, has estab-
lished a laboratory at that university, and Dr. Ebbing-
haus has done the same at Berlin. Dr. Miinsterberg
of the University of Freiburg deserves great credit for
the laboratory which he privately maintains there.
Similar plans are under consideration for the universi-
ties of Bonn, of Breslau, of Prague, and doubtless
elsewhere. Psychological societies have been formed,
though the most prominent of these the Gesellschaft
fiir Experimental-Psychologic, of Berlin and of Mun-
ich, devote their efforts mainly to the problems of
"Psychic Research." The many literary contribu-
tions both as special studies and as periodical essays
testify to the rapid progress of psychology in all parts
of Germany. A serious obstacle to the growth of the
department has been the difficulty of obtaining pecu-
niary aid from the State ; this difficulty being increased
by the isolation of the several parts of a German uni-
versity, that prevents an easy affiliation of the psycho-
logical laboratory to the kindred departments of physi-
ology or physics. There can be little doubt that as
the special needs of experimental psychology are more
distinctly appreciated, these hindrances to its free de-
velopment will be gradually removed.*
* For further information concerning German psychology I can only refer
in English to Ribot's " German Psychology of To-day," (by no means as good
a compilation as his other works,) and to articles by Prof. Hall and by Dr.
Cattell, pablished in Mind. There are very few general articles or treatises
on the aims and methods of the new psychology in any language ; in German
one may consult a few of Wundt's "Essays," and a lecture by Dr. GiJtz Mar-
tius, Ucbir die Ziele unj Ergtbnissc dcr Expcrimentetlen Psychologie, l8S8.
CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL SOUL-LIFE.
The experiments of M. Alfred Binet* prove that
in the limbs and sense-organs of hysterical persons we
can provoke various complex movements of adapta-
tion which are performed without consciousness.
There are certain details of vision that escape con-
sciousness, yet are perceived by the eye. Similarly
the anaesthetic hand, a hand that from a nervous dis-
ease is deprived of sensibility, jots down in automatic
writing impressions which it receives. The hand is
called anaesthetic because the patient knows nothing
about it ; it is not in connection with his conscious-
ness. M. Binet proves that feeling is not extinct in
it ; for it has a feeling of its own and its psychic acts
show a certain intelligence or adaptability.
The experiments of M. Binet are instances of
peripheral nerve-activity not entering into the sphere
of central soul-life.
Experiments of a similar kind were made by the
late Mr. Gurney, one of the founders of the Society
for Psychical Research of London. From an accountf
of his experiments on " Intelligent Automatism," re-
ported, in the main, in Mr. Gurney's own words, we
quote the following :
" Mr. G. A. Smith, the ' hypnotiser,' sent off one of the pa-
tients into a mesmeric sleep, and in this sleep the patient was told
that he was to write some particular word, or to count the number
of e'z in a particular verse, or to do a particular multiplication
sum when he awoke Then he was wakened and at once en-
gaged in reading aloud, or counting backwards, or doing something
that engrossed his full attention ; but his right hand was placed on
the planchette (an instrument on wheels containing a pencil), the
paper and planchette being always concealed from the subject's
eyes, so that he could not know, unless he were able to guess from
the blind movements of the instrument under his hand (which
guessing was made very difificultby the occupation found for him), '
what letters or figures (if any) the instrument was tracing. ' As
a rule, he was always offered a sovereign to say what the writing
was, but the reward was never gained.' On being sent back into
the mesmeric sleep, he recalled the whole process, though in the
waking state he could never tell what the movements of the
planchette under his hand were engaged in producing. Here is
Mr. Gurney's account of the results as regards the arithmetic il
sums worked by what he calls the ' secondary intelligence ' :
—
" The sums given were simple, as most of the ' subjects ' were
inexpert at mental arithmetic. There were 131 sums in which
three figures had to be multiplied by a single one ; of these 52 were
quite right, 28 had three figures in the answer right, iS had two
figures right, and 14 had one figure right only, whilst 12 were quite
wrong, and 7 were either so illegible and muddled as to be unde-
cipherable, or only a small stroke or curve was made at all
In some cases the sum itself was correctly written, but no attempt
was made to put the answer A few sums of other kinds
were also given : of 14 simple additions (of about the following dif-
ficulty :4-|-7 + 9-rii-l- 13), six were done correctly, two were
Published in The Open" Court : No. 100, "Proof of Double Conscious-
ness in Hysterical Individuals " ; No. loi, "The Relations Between the Two
Consciousnesses of Hysterical Individuals " ; No. 102, " The Hysterical Eye " ;
and No. 112, " Mechanism or Subconsciousness ? "
t Spectator, June 30, 1888.
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quite wrong, and the remaining six were either not done at all, or
the answers were illegible scribbles Another case illustrates
the very distinct memory, on re-hypnotisation, of what had been
written. Wells was told to work out the sum, ' 13 loaves at 5d.
each,' and instantly woke as usual. He wrote, ' 13 loaf at jd. is
5s. 5d.' When hypnotized again, and asked to say what he had
written, he replied, ' 13 loaf—oh, I've put /('a/ instead of loaves—
at sd. is 5s. 5d. I've written the 13 twice—see—but I crossed it
out.' He then proceeded, by a long roundabout process, to work
the problem out, arriving at the correct answer again.
"Another form of experiment was to tell the ' subject ' to count
the number of times a certain letter occurred in a given verse.
Thus, Wells was told to write down the number of times the letter
e occurred in the verse— " Mary had a little lamb, etc ," and then,
after saying the verse once quickly through to show that he knew
it, he was instantly awakened and given Tit-Bits to read. Whilst
thus engaged he wrote. The letter E comes 11 times—which is right.
The same experiment was tried with Parsons, who also was kept
occupied by being set to read immediately upon waking ; but he
was not so accurate, and wrote down -12.' He was completely
successful, however, when told to write the number of e's in
' God save our gracious Qaeen,
Long live our noble Queen,
God save the Queen,'
and wrote 11, having read excellently the whole time."
Concerning Mr. Gurney's explanation of these
facts, the same account adds :
" His inference is that these trances induced by mesmerism,
or whatever we like to call the peculiar influence which special
persons seem to possess of rendering others unconscious,—sepa-
rates the mind of the patient into two separate planes of conscious-
ness, each of which is capable of accomplishing such simple intel-
lectual tasks as the subject's education has fitted him to perform,
but nevertheless without the privity of the other, so that the man
is apparently subdivided into two men, one of whom is reading
aloud, and the other working a sum or counting the number of
e's in a stanza, though the man who is doing the sum has little
or no knowledge of what his alter ego is reading aloud ; while the
man who is reading aloud has no knowledge at all of the opera-
tions of the alter ego who is doing the sum."
According to our view these two souls are not two
different beings, but they are psychic activities per-
formed in two different spheres—the spheres of cen-
tral and peripheral soul-life. If the activity of periph-
eral soul-life is not connected with that of the central
soul-life, the central soul can know nothing about the
processes that take place in the peripheral regions of
our mind. Accordingly we call them unconscious. If
the peripheral nerve-activity is indirectly, yet not too
distantly, connected with the central soul, we may
have a dim idea of its proceedings. Thus, we do not
know whether the nerves of our intestines are now
secreting particles of fat or albuminoids or any other
substance, yet we can know upon the whole whether
or not they are in a state of health. Such conditions
we call subconscious.
The experiments of Mr. Gurney as well as those of
M. Binet corroborate the fact that every nervous gang-
lion is a brain in miniature, as vice versa the whole
brain is but a centralization of many ganglions. All
nervous substance exhibits, in the performance of
the psychic functions of irritation and reflex motion
throughout, a marvelous adaptability to circumstances.
Thus, the decapitated frog, when his back is irritated
on the right side by a feather saturated in a solution
of hydrochloric acid, scratches the spot and removes
the irritant.
This might be called a simple reflex motion and
can perhaps be explained as purely mechanical. Form-
erly it was believed to take place without any con-
sciousness. But now it is known, that if the frog's
right leg be amputated and his back be again irritated,
after several unsuccessful trials to remove the irritant
by his right leg, he will use his left leg.
This is plainly a process of adaptation to circum-
stances. The central soul of the decapitated frog, as
can be proven by other experiments, has been removed
;
but parts of the peripheral soul still continue their
activity in the spinal cord so long as the nervous sub-
stance remains in a condition of comparative health.
And the activity of the peripheral nerve-substance
cannot be merely mechanical as are the movements of
a machine; judging from the experiment of the frog,
they must be psychical at the same time. The mech-
anism of nervous reflex motions lives and feels. Even
the peripheral ganglions possess a kind of conscious-
ness of their own, dim though it may be.
There is no difference of kind between the periph-
eral and central soul, there is a difference of degree
only. And the difference that obtains is undoubtedly
produced by a division of labor. This will at the same
time explain the fact that the lower a nervous system is,
the more independent are its peripherial ganglia. The
central soul-life is less differentiated in a frog than in
man, and still less in a colonial sea-nettle.
The decapitated-frog experiment is in so far to the
same purpose as Mr. Gurney's and M. Binet's experi-
ments, for it proves the independent action of periph-
eral soul-life without any interference of, or connec-
tion with, central soul-life.
'
The phenomena of peripheral and central soul life
are not a coordinated duality ; they form a hierarchical,
i. e., a super- ordinated system. The central soul rises
from the peripheral soul. The former being taken
away, the latter may continue to exist ; but we see no.
possibility for the central soul to exist, if its foundation,
the peripheral soul, is withdrawn. We can remove
the spire of a church-steeple, and let the base stand,
but we can not remove the base and have the spire
remain in its place. Thus the central soul of con-
sciousness, being the combined product of a certain part
of the activity of the peripheral soul, can not lead an
absolute life of abstract existence. It subsists and can
subsist only upon condition of the peripheral activity
of the nervous system.
How closely the central and the peripheral activities
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are interwoven, can be learned from the facts of post-
hypnotic suggestions. Mr. Gurney's experiments were
purposely so arranged as to make the execution of a
post-hypnotic suggestion an act of automatic and un-
conscious intelligence. This, however, is a special
case only and indeed an exception.
Post-hypnotic suggestions, as a rule, rise from the
peripheral sphere of unconscious life into the region
of consciousness. There they appear as if created out
of nothing in no other manner than inspirations may
come to a poet. The central soul is in possession of
certain data ; but it can, out of itself merely, give no
account of their origin. A number of conscious ideas
are a living presence in the mind, and that is all that
from consciousness alone can be learned. Their factors
may be, and usually are, hidden in the depth of uncon-
sciousness. The result only of nervous activity be-
comes conscious, but not the details of its conditions.
Consciousness knows least of all about the nervous
fibers, the brain-cells, and their distribution.
The subjects who have received post-hypnotic sug-
gestions deal with them very differently. They either
execute them without heeding what they do, almost
unconsciously ; or, especially if the suggestions are
absurd, they try to suppress them. Some succeed in
doing so, some yield to their impulse after a vain
struggle. Some execute them, and if asked why they
act thus, they either invent a plausible motive or an-
swer that the idea just struck them to do it.
We quote an example from Forel's latest publica-
tion on Hypnotism :
" I said to a hypnotized patient : ' .\fter awaking the idea will
occur to you to place a chair upon the table, and then to tap me
on the left shoulder with your right hand. ' I then ordered him to do
several other things, adding: 'Count as far as six, and awake.'
The pitient counted and when he reached six, opened his eyes
drowsily, saw a chair and stared at it.—Often there arises a con-
flict between reason and the powerful impulse of suggestion. Either
the former or the latter will gain the upper hand according as the
suggestion is natural or unnatural and as the hynotized subject is
suggestible. Our hypnotized subject after having stared at the
chair for awhile, suddenly rose, took the chair and placed it on the
table I said ; ' Why do you do this ? ' The reply always varies ac-
cording to the culture, temperament, and quality of the hypnotized
subject and of the hypnosis. One will say : ' I followed my im-
_
pulse.' Another: ' The idea occurred to me.' A third alleges an
a posteriori motive saying, the chair had been in his way, it had
bothered him. A fourth after the perfor .nance of the action, loses
every recollection and appears to awaken at that very moment.
Particularly in the last instance the subject has the staring glance
of a somnambulist
; it is more or less rigid, his movements are au-
tomatic, and do not cease to be so until after the performance of
the act."
Another curious instance mentioned by Dr. Forel
is the following :
" To a hypnotized woman I said on a Monday : ' Next Sunday
morning precisely at quarter past seven you will call on me. You
will see me in a sky-blue coat, with two long horns on ray head,
and you will then ask me, when I was born,' Next Sunday I was
sitting in ray study, and had forgotten the whole affair. My pa-
tient at thirty-five rainutes past seven knocked at ray door, entered,
and burst into laughter. I at once recollected my suggestion, which
now was actually realized, exactly in the raanner it was given."
In the waking state the central soul plays a domi-
nant part. This is accomplished positively as well as
negatively
;
positively by concentration and negatively
by inhibition. The consciousness of the central soul
can be and usually is concentrated upon one object,
viz., the object of attention. But all the many sen-
sory impressions that are received in all quarters of
the periphery would greatly detract from the clearness
of attention, if they were constantly permitted to enter
the sphere of the central soul and to interfere with its
activity. The central soul, if concentrated upon a sub-
ject of interest, sees fit not to heed other things, it
suppresses their observation.
For instance, I am writing now and do not notice
certain noises about me. I look up from my paper
to collect my thoughts, but I do not observe the scenes
outside of the window upon which I look. They are
indifferent to me, and if afterwards asked what I had
heard or what I had seen, most likely I should not be
able to tell. I heard the noises—the word "I" here
signifies my ears; I heard certain words but I did not
listen—the word "I" here signifies my consciousness.
I saw certain things, but I did not look ; so I can-
not tell what I heard or what I saw. My conscious-
ness on the one hand, and my eyes or ears on the
other, are two different things.
It may happen, however, that the sound of a word
that I did not heed lingers in my memory still. I re-
call the sound, and now I perceive its meaning too.
A certain scene that I glanced at in an absent-minded
state, may have impressed itself strongly enough as
afterwards to come up in my recollection. Some per-
sons passed by ; my eye had seen them, but I had
taken no notice of them. Being asked whether a cer-
tain acquaintance of mine had been among them, I
might then positively know that he was.
If we could ask the eye, it would certainly always
be able to tell what it had seen. If we could look into
the memories registered in some of the sensory gang-
lions, we could know what scenes were photographed
by the eye ; for every scene upon which the eye looked
is registered in nerve-substance. We can, however,
not expect to recollect a sensation that was prohibited
to enter, and thus never entered, our consciousness.
Max Dessoir* gives an account that, if thoroughly
reliable, is of great interest.
" Several friends were at ray house, and one of them, Mr.
W
, sat apart reading, while we others were talking together.
Suddenly the conversation turned upon a name X
,
which
particularly interested Mr. W . He abruptly turned round,
and asked what had happened to Mr. X He declared, that
'^ Das Dopptl-iclt, p. ig.
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he knew nothing of our previous conversation ; and that he only
had heard the name mentioned. Then, with his consent, I hyp-
notized him, and in the state of deep hypnosis I asked him again,
and to our great astonishment he coherently related the whole
trend of the conversation that took place while he was reading."
In another passage Dessoir says :
'
' The idea of the husband when his wife scolded him for
having mislaid the house-key at the inn, was after all not bad.
"Wait—said he—until I get drunk again, and I shall certainly
find out where I left it."
It is noteworthy, that in dreams as well as in states
of intoxication, certain people seem upon the whole to
reveal always a similar character which, however, may
greatly differ from their normal condition. The con-
scious life of the central soul being extinguished, and
the inhibition that in the waking state is constantly ex-
ercised being abolished, the peripheral soul-life oozes
out in its originality, and however it may differ from
the waking state it shows again and again, under sim-
ilar circumstances, naturally similar traits of character.
There is accordingly a truth in the Latin proverb :"/«
vino Veritas."
The same may be said about dreams. Dreams re-
veal tons characteristic features of our peripheral soul-
life, p. c.
CONTEMPORANEOUS FRENCH PHILOSOPHY.*
CORRESPONDENCE OF LUCIEN ARREAT.
My Dear Sir :— In assigning to me the task of writing for your
review the philosophical correspondence of France, you have rightly
inferred that it would be of especial interest to present, upon this
occasion, what I am pleased to call, with reference to recent phi-
losophical publications, a (riliqtie de position. So allow me, there-
fore, without further preamble to introduce the subject to your
readers.
The philosophers of France, it is unnecessary to say, have
been concerned at all times with the subject of a general philos-
ophy ; but since the performance of Auguste Comte, now become
a thing of the past, there has not been produced among us any
conception of a truly general character. The numerous problems
of philosophy are being probed and renovated at basal points, and
whenever the ambition is evinced to construct some partial syn-
thesis, it usually happens in the domain of psychology and from the
point of view of the evolution of the phenomena involved. Even
psychology, which has become the centre of philosophical re-
searches, no longer remains strictly physiological
;
people, nowa-
days, have begun to pay greater attention to the data of sociology
and history.
In support of the last brief statement I might adduce the en-
tire literary activity of the late M. Guyau. M. Fouillee, with
painstaking devotion is now superintending the publication of the
manuscripts of the much-lamented young master, and two volumes
have recently appeared under the titles of ' Education and He-
redity, A Sociological Study " and " Art From a Sociological
Point of View." Let it suffice, merely to call attention to the latter
works. M. Guyau at all times deservedly engages our curiosity,
and your readers know too well the fundamental character and con-
tent of his ideas to justify the need of a present e.'iposition of the
same. Whether as moralist or sesthetician, as psychologist or
critical historian, Guyau ever strove ultimately to reach a concep-
All the her.
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rationed works are contained in the Bibtiotk^tiue deph'
Paris: F^lix Alcan, Publi:her.
tion of the world—a theory of cosmic philosophy. This feature of
his character must not be overlooked, if we wish correctly to ap-
preciate as well the breadth as the partial prematurity of his mode
of thought.
In the same line, we must mention a small volume by M. de
Roberty : "The Unknowable, Its Metaphysics and Psychology,"
(L'iniennaissablc, sa metaphysique, sa psychologie). A Russian by
birth, M. de Roberty passed through the school of Comte, and
published his first important works in the review edited by the late
M. Littre. According to M. de Roberty, philosophy hitherto has
not been a theory of Knowledge, as it has been called, but rather
a theory of the Unknowable (in Kant's works for the greater part,
in one-half of Spencer, and to a notable extent with Comte him-
self). In thisbook, — a mere skirmish by the van-guard, to use
the writer's own words,— the author shows us, that the problem of
the Unknowable is only a metaphj sical aspect of the problem of
the limits of knowledge, and that agnosticism is but a transient
historical position. M. de Roberty's criticism is new and pro-
found ; it certainly places us in a logical, or methodical, position,
that is much more correct. We can only ask, whether, in the face
of the problem of the world, and the reduction of the unknowable
to the unknown, we shall meanwhile be able to transform our-
selves into pure "intellectuals," without still remaining " emo-
tionals,"—I mean to say, poets. At all events, in the opinion of M.
de Roberty, a great synthesis does not seem possible before soci-
ology and psychology have been codstructed ; and as regards psy-
chology, which in the disguise of a general science is now sallying
forth to the conquest of the universe, the author relegates the
same to the primary school of facts.
And what, the question at this juncture arises, is the present
status of psychology ? In France there has been no attempt to
create a complete work after the manner of Wundt or of Spencer
;
but there has been the more modest and, doubtless, more useful
production of good monographs. The most remarkable of the
present year has been "The Psychology of Attention," by M.
Ribot, of which I need not speak, since you are offering your
readers a translation of the same.
By far more extensive, although even more special, is M.
Paulhan's book, "Mental Activity and the Elements of Mind."
M. Paulhan explains the entire mechanism of mind by the gen-
eral law of systematic association (and, as complemental thereto,
by that of inhibition) which is a law of finality ; to this law he
subordinates the secondary forms, association by contrast, by re-
semblance, by contiguity—and he thus succeeds in destroying, or
rather he reduces to a very modest role, the English theory of
associationism. The dominant idea of the book is that mind rep-
resents a totality of active elements, differently arranged, that is,
made up of various systems of tendencies, desires, etc., systems
constituting real sub-personalities, in variable equilibrium with
one another, and of which the true personality, which we may
call the predominant, the directive one, is merely a kind of resultant.
The points of connection of this theory with the researches of M.
Luys and of M. Binet are at once manifest, and it is scarcely
necessary to point out the line of work of these authors to bring
under one identical comprehensive fact all the phenomena pre-
sented to us under the normal or pathological forms of dreams,
natural or provoked somnambulism, etc.
The voluminous treatise, teeming with facts, by M. Pierre
Janet
—
Psychological Automatism, etc.,—comes like a capstone to
the book of M. Paulhan. The object of the present investigation,
the author says, is human activity in its simplest and most ele-
mentary forms; and he adds: "This study of the elementary
forms of activity will be for us at the same time the study of the
elementary forms of sensibility and of consciousness. " M Janet
has gathered his teachings from persistent and patient experiments
upon the state of provoked somnambulism. As you well know, he
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is of the number of those, who have successfully devoted them-
selves to this branch of study, in virhich the philosophers of France
are the foremost leaders.
Consciousness, according to M. Janet, is ever present in the
activity of a living being : consciousness is always an organisation,
more or less complex, of elements of sensation, and therefore it
might be defined as a "synthetical activity." On the other hand,
the syntheses constructed are not destroyed, they last, are pre
served; they constitute, finally, the consequences of the general law
of preservation and of reproduction examined in this work. Auto-
matism thus corresponds to a severance, more or less wide, of the
two activities, the creative and the conservative.
There remains to point out a fact of historical significance
—
the return to Maine de Biran, who, writes M. Janet, seems truly
'
' to have foreseen the experiments that are at present being made.
"
This somewhat forgotten French philosopher further experiences
a kind of revival in M. A. Bertrand's book : La psychologic- de Feffort
et les doctrines contemporaines, (The Psychology of Effort and Current
Theories Regarding the Same). To Maine de Biran must certainly
be referred the earliest French theory of unconsciousness.
In establishing these legitimate returns to the great ones of
the past—to Leibnitz or to Maine de Biran, to Descartes or to
Spinoza—we cannot avoid acknowledging a certain unity of direc-
tion even in the bewildering mazes of philosophy. Particularly,
however, in the works of the moderns, divergent though they be,
is this progression towards unity of method to be remarked. In
this way alone may we hope for harmony and that universal assent
which is one of the elements of human certainty.
Paris, October 24th. Lucien Arreat.
SONNET.
BY MARY MORGAN (gOWAN LEA).
" The pursuits of the simple nations are still the
sports of the artificial ones."
—
Thoreau.
A TRUCE to work ! Behold the star of eve !
Down with the pen and join the merry throng,
The jocund sport ; for may it not belong
Also to life ? Shall man not know to weave
Into Time's sombre woof one thread of joy ?
Abandon, dare he not, the irksome task
A moment in the sunshine's glow to bask ?
My soul responded, "Pleasure, too, doth cloy
Excepting as it be with progress found.
Deem not that labor is of joy the foe :
With heart and mind harmonious there is nought
Confers such lasting happiness below.
Unite the chords of life in one glad sound
;
Sublimest work of blessedness is wrought
!
CORRESPONDENCE.
A DEFENCE OF CELIBACY AND CELIBATES.
To the Editor of The Open Court :
—
It is not a little amusing to observe the manner in which Mrs.
Susan Channing treated her subject, "Celibacy and its Effects
upon the Individual," in The Open Court for October 31, 1889.
Her argument reminds one of the person who accidentally puts
salt in his coffee, mistaking it for sugar, but heroically holds his
peace until his companion has done likewise. In other words, it
would seem from Mrs. Channing's article that human nature is
the same—that misery still loves company, however much the
philanthropic enthusiast may declare to the contrary.
Everybody will, no doubt, agree with Moncure D. Conway
and Mrs. Channing that there is no English word or even a chart
of the passionate relations of the sexes. Nor can there be. It is
entirely contrary to the laws of nature. The experience of one
can by no manner of means serve as a beacon-guide for another,
and just as the wind that would anchor one in the peaceful harbor
of safety might dash another upon the rocks of Scylla and Charyb-
dis. Hence no rule, or chart, or guide can be adopted, however
much, and how greatly, one might be demanded by those who sail
upon the uncertain and often tempestuous sea of matrimony. Each
must work out his own salvation, the temperament and disposition
entailed by heredity having greatly to do with the final result,
whether it be good or bad.
While some of the writer's arguments may be good—indeed,
she builds up a strong case, and shows great research—the attempt
to prove deterioration as one of the universal results of celibacy is
certainly considerably attenuated and consequently weak, if not
an utter failure. If a man or woman choses to forego the pleasures
resultant upon a gratification of the sex-affection, or even those in
whom the development of this qualification for manhood and
womanhood is not so great, and devotes his time to the cause and
investigation of science, art, literature, music, etc., as thousands
have done and will continue to do as long as the world stands, do
the grand discoveries they have made and may make, the glorious
works of art produced, the inspiring epics and elegies written,
have the least tendency to degrade or tear down the grand fabric
of human intelligence and progress ? On the contrary, these dis-
coveries and productions build up and make nobler and better the
human race ; they serve as an example of what excellence may be
achieved by perseverance and labor when the mind is free to act
at will, and not hampered by domestic broils and troubles.
Very difficult would be the task of him to whom would be as-
signed the task or duty of estimating the amount of good done to
the world by the works of that world-renowned Italian bachelor,
Michael Angelo, whose wonderful creations 'have been the admira-
tion of all civilized nations since the fifteenth century ; who does
not dwell with ecstasy upon that sublime old doxology written in
the seventeenth century, "Praise God from Whom all Blessings
Flow," by the bachelor bishop, Kenbein the author ; also the soul
inspiring hymns of dear old Isaac Watts, Toplady, Dr. Miihlen-
berg, author of " I would not live alway," Montgomery, Cowper,
etc., among hymn-writers. Other illustrations innumerable of the
beneficent effects that bachelors, or their works, have had upon
the human race through all ages might be cited, but the names of
a limited number must suffice : Grey, Berridge, David Hume,
Horn Tooke, John Randolph, Washington Irving, Baron Hum-
boldt, Samuel J. Tilden, Thaddeus Stevens, the late ex-Vice-Presi-
dent Wilson, Alexander Stephens, Allen Thorndike Rice, John G.
Whittier, Governor David B. Hill, of New York, Phillips Brookes,
and hosts of others almost equally as prominent and illustrious.
Nor should examples of the value of single womsn to their
fellow beings be omitted. Thousands have been made better for
having read the impassioned poetical compositions of the Carey
sisters, Alice and Phoebe, and no one can witness the wonderful
delineations of dramatic art as depicted by that woman of whom
every true American should be proud, Mary Anderson, without
being moved by tender thoughts and lofty aspirations. Scores of
others could be cited, if necessary, but these will suffice at this
time.
The divine injunction that ' 'It is not good that THE man should
be alop e, " no doubt had reference to Adam alone, else why does
the artic le the precede the word man ?
.
Had no one else ap-
peared upon the scene there can be no doubt that Adam would
have become lonesome and exclaimed with Alexander Selkirk,
"Oh, solitude, where are thy charms?" However this may be,
many will seriously doubt whether Mrs. Channing or anybody
else would desire to fulfill all the demands and obey all the laws of
the Old Testament, where this injunction, that it is not good for
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man to live alone, is found, which is always quoted as a clincher
by those who incessantly advocate marriage early and often, ap-
parently without regard to fitness or qualification on the part of
the interested parties to the important event. What was good and
meet for Adam many thousands of years ago, might not hold good
in all instances in the light of the intelligence of the closing years
of the nineteenth century.
Some over-zealous people declare with more vehemence than
logic that it is the divine duty of every man and every woman to
take upon himself or herself the responsibilities of a family, regard-
less of qualifications for the same. Rev. Dr. T. DeWitt Talmage
in a recent sermon to women made use of the following terse and
sensible language : " Woman was an independent creation, and was
intended, if she chose, to live alone, to walk alone, act alone, think
alone, and fight her battles alone. The Bible says, it is not good
for man to be alone, but never says it is not good for woman to be
alone ; and the simple fact is, that many women who are harnessed
for life in the marriage relation would be a thousand-fold better off
if they were alone." And it is safe to say that husbands who do
not make their wives happy, are not over-burdened with joys them-
selves.
In the Foriiin for December, 1888, Junius Henry Browne, in
a very able article, entitled, " To Marry or not to Marry ! " says,
page 438 : "To marry is not an obligation, as might be thought
from current talk : it is purely optional. He who refrains from
wedlock and fatherhood cannot, in the overcrowded state of the
globe, be charged with violation of duty to his fellows. To intimate
that a man should take a wife, when he has not found a woman
who wishes him to take her, is akin to inviting the blind to a spec-
tacle, or a cripple to enter a race, and yet such intimations are in-
cessant."
Again the great criminals of the world were not celibates.
Even Agrippina, who plotted to secure the throne of Rome for her
son, Nero, was a married woman ; Cleopatra, the beautiful but
wicked queen of ancient Egypt, was much married ; Clytemnestra
murdered her husband Agamemnon, and as in ancient so in modern
history, nearly all crime was or is committed by youths or married
persons.
No great amount of argument is necessary to prove beyond
dispute that marriage is at present the most congenial method of
dealing with the sex-affection, as now affecting the human family
to a great or less degree, but to assert that celibacy deteriorates the
human family, is certainly talking at random, as history very
plainly demonstrates the contrary to be the true status of affairs.
Observation, if not biased, teaches the same. Clint L. Luce.
BOOK REVIEWS.
The E.\cellent Religion. An Essay on the Relations Existing
Between Agnosticism, the Polar Theory of Being, and the
Higher Theism. By G. C. Griffith-Jones (Lara). London :
Watts & Co.
This eloquently and clearly written pamphlet of thirty-two
pages by Mr. G. C. Griffith-Jones, is an exposition of the doctrine
of " The Excellent Religion"—a faith based upon the principles
of Agnosticism. The treatment falls into three divisions desig-
nated ; (i) The Parting of the Ways
; (2) Agnosticism and the Po-
lar Theory
; (3) The Doctrine of the Excellent Religion. By ' ' the
parting of the ways " the author understands the divergent point
of the various roads by which humanity seek salvation : the roads
of Christianity, Atheism, and Agnosticism. The watchword of
Christianity is "Memory," of Atheism "Does it Pay," of Agnos-
ticism "Progress"; but the middle course. Atheism, is defini-
tively discarded and the question thus remains, " Can Christian
and Agnostic join hands over their superficial differences and tread
the way of future progress with equal steps ? " This depends upon
definition, and upon the renunciation by the Christian of "the
monuments of past credulity and present folly upon which are
graven the creeds, the dogmas, and the doctrines which, fixed for
all time by the fiat of infallibility, may never be altered." Can
the Christian do that, then are Christianity and Agnosticism one
;
for Agnosticism is defined to be simply this, "that a man shall not
say that he knows or belie-jes that which he has no reasonable grounds
for knowing or /leliering."
And now as to the religious position of Agnosticism. "To
theology," says the author, " the Agnostic philosophy presents an
unbreakable phalanx of arguments .... but to religion it stretches
out the strong right hand of friendship, and with her bows the head
in reverent silence before the majesty and mystery which religion
calls God, and philosophy the Absolute." Agnosticism is not
destructive, not negative : " On the contrary. With the finger of
well-assured certainty and the authority of ages of mental develop-
ment, it points to the region of the unknown as the treasure-
house of infinite possibilities, as the potential realization of man's
deepest yearnings, and the possible fulfilment of his loftiest aspi-
rations For all the Agnostic may affirm or deny, that
' blank, impenetrable wall ' which stands at the end of every path-
way of intellectual investigation may be the veil which hides from
eyes too weak to bear its glory the supernal splendor of the pre-
sence of God." In other words Agnosticism, although appealing
to the authority of " ages of mental de-celopment" zxiA pointing to
the unknown as a treasure-house of " infinite possibilities," never-
theless erects, or confesses there exists, a "blank, impenetrable
wall " at the end oi " every pathway of intellectual investigation."
But if that wall recedes as mental development advances, is it a
wall? And how can the watchword of intellectual "Progress"
be reconciled with arrival at a place where we must stop—stop
" to bow in reverent silence before the mystery which philosophy
calls the absolute ?"
What that Absolute, that Unknowable is, appears from the
following : " On what man knows and yet shall learn, he may
reason ; and he shall learn enough to reason upon forever it he
will. On what he does not know, and, with his present powers,
nei-er can know, he may still dream to his heart's content, speculat-
ing hopefully and trustfully upon the infinite possibilities of the
Great Perhaps." But that which cannot be known, cannot exist
;
the idea of something unknowable ' would imply the existence of an
object whose existence is not manifested, /. e
,
existence without
reality—which is a contradiction, an impossibility ' : the idea of
the Unknowable deliberately posits a knowledge which is not-
knowledge. And, naturally, this leads to dualism, for the author
believes " that there will be a faith of the future which, while it
will be based on knowledge, will soar far into regions where knowl-
edge is impossible."
The second part of Mr. Griffith-Jones's pamphlet, "Agnos-
ticism and the Polar Theory," is more properly the philosophical
part, wherein the conclusions of the Agnostic position above dis-
cussed are logically stated and their relations to the "Polar
Theory of Being " defined
;
the third part delineates " the super-
structure " of the Excellent Religion. It is to this position alone
of Mr. Griffith-Jones's that wa object—the position regarding the
"delineation of the Knowable from the Unknowable." With the
faith and purity of aspiration pervading the whole dissertation we
are in perfect accord. iinpn.
NOTES.
We refer the attention of our readers to M. Lucien Arreat's
interesting review, in the present number, of contemporaneous
French philosophy.
The essays by M. Binet upon " Double Consciousness " are
interrupted with this week's issue, to make room for his Rejoinder
to Mr. Romanes upon the question of the psychic life of micro-
organisms—the delay incident to which has been previously noted.
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